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ABSTRACT: The corruption is a complex and generalized phenomenon all over the world, with 
cultural, social, psychological, political and economical dimensions. The defining and the studying 
of the phenomenon are going through the most different thinking filters known in the specialized 
literature: social-cultural, political, administrative and economic. The article’s aim is to quantify 
and  analyze  the  relationship  between  corruption  and  political,  administrative  and  economic 
determinants factors, through a regressive "pool data" model. The sample includes the 27 countries 
of the actual European Union, and the data refer to the period 1996-2008. The study shows that the 
limitation of corruption’s phenomena (maximizing FC index) has the result of increasing of social 
welfare (maximizing HDI index).  
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The  corruption  is  a  complex  and  generalized  phenomenon  all  over  the  world,  with 
economical, cultural, social, psychological, political, administrative and religious dimensions. By 
consequence, defining and the studying of the phenomenon are going through the most different 
thinking  filters  known  in  the  specialized  literature:  economic,  social-cultural,  political, 
administrative  and  religious.  Its  conceptualization  has  attracted  in  recent  past  competing  and 
numerous views and approaches. Nye(Nye, 1967) defined corruption as a behavior which deviates 
from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private 
clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence and he included in this category bribery, nepotism and misappropriation.  
In the economic approach, the government controls the distribution of revenues and the 
taxation of onerous costs. The private individuals and firms, in such context, tend to receive the 
advantages from public authority. If the “payment for advantages” is illegal, then we can talk about 
corruption. Seen as a transaction between private and public sector actors, the effect of corruption is 
the tendency to convert illegitimately collective goods into private regarding payoffs (Heidenheimer 
et. al., 1993). In other words, Mauro saw corruption as an extra tax which leaves less money for 
public expenditures (Mauro, 1997). Tanzi sustain this opinion and suggest that corruption transfers 
resources from the mass public to the elites – and generally from the poor to the rich (Tanzi, 1998). 
But the most widespread definition regards corruption as a misuse of public power for private gain 
(Rose-Ackerman,  1999).  According  to  Rose-Ackerman,  the  corruption  is  a  symptom  for  the 
situations in which the management of the state is inefficient. 
The consequences of corruption on economic growth it is perceived to be negative, but a 
series of studies was conducted in order to find that this perception is correct or not. Based on this 
understanding, this paper intends to clarify the relationship between corruption and social welfare. 
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Literature review 
The  consequences  of  corruption  have  attracted  much  attention  in  recent  years  by  both 
academics and policy makers.   
In  spite  of  the  general  perception  that  corruption  have  a  negative  impact  on  economic 
growth, one of the first studies about  corruption (Leff, 1964)  argued that corruption may “grease 
the  wheels”  of  public  activities,  making  individuals  to  avoid  bureaucratic  delay,  especially  in 
countries  where  bureaucratic  regulations  are  cumbersome,  and  government  employees  to  work 
harder if they receive bribe. This is why Leff asserts that corruption improves social welfare. Leys 
(Leys, 1965) and Huntington(Huntington, 1968) also support the idea that corruption has positive 
impact on economic growth because it increase the efficiency especially in the public sector. Lui  
developed  an  equilibrium  queuing  model  of  bribery  in  which  the  decision  makings  on  bribe 
payments are decentralized to the customers (Lui, 1985). Based on this, Lui proved that, under 
some specified conditions, the bribing model is capable of giving socially optimal solutions.  Lui 
argued that sometimes, the privately optimal speed of service chosen by the server may be faster 
than the speed without bribery. Acemoglu and Verdier, based on the case of an economy where 
contracts  are  necessary  to  encourage  investments,  finds  that  it  may  be  optimal  to  allow  some 
corruption and not enforce property rights fully(Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998). Another finding of 
Acemoglu and Verdier is that less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right 
enforcement and more corruption as a way to encourage development.  
The second series of studies suggest that corruption doesn’t improve efficiency.  
First in this line is Myrdal (Myrdal, 1968), who argued that bureaucrats may deliberately 
delay to solve the problems  so as to attract more bribes. This point of view  is sustained  more 
recently by a large number of empirical studies, based mainly on indices of corruption that are 
subjective assessments of the level of corruption, which suggest that corruption has negative effects 
on the economic and social development.  
Most  of  the  empirical  studies  of  the  impact  of  corruption  have  explored  the  efficiency 
implications  of  corruption  through  its  impact  on  growth  and  investment,  on  composition  of 
government expenditure and on allocation of foreign direct investment  
First empirical study that explored the impact of corruption on growth and investment was 
conduced by Mauro, who used a sample of 67 countries and finds that corruption is negatively 
linked  to the  level  of  investment  and  economic  growth,  because  the  incentive  to  invest  of  the 
businessmen tend to diminish and so, the private investments will slow down (Mauro, 1995). In a 
newer study, that presented two models that rely on strategic complementarities to obtain multiple 
equilibrium, Mauro showed that the link between widespread corruption and low economic growth 
is explained by the behaviour of  the individuals regarding public affairs and the behaviour of the 
politicians in a corrupt society (Mauro, 2002). Tanzi and Davoodi find that countries with higher 
perceived corruption tend to have lower real per capita GDP and countries with lower perceived 
corruption tend to have higher real per capita GDP. Another finding is that there is a negative 
association between corruption perception indexes and economic growth measured by growth in 
real per capita GDP (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000).  
On the other hand, Pelegrini and Gerlagh (2004) find that the indirect transmission channels 
are  the  significant  one  in  explaining  the  negative  effect  of  corruption  on  growth  rates,  so  the 
conclusion is that once other relevant factors are controlled, corruption is insignificant with respect 
to growth in GDP per capita (Pelegrini and Gerlagh, 2004). On the contrary, Everhart et al. (2009) 
suggest that the impact of corruption on the level of public investment is not significant, but the 
interaction  between  corruption  and  public  investment  implies  a reduction  in  private  investment 
(Everhart et al., 2009). In a recent study, Aidt (2009) doesn’t find convincing and robust evidence 
that corruption may have a significant negative effect on the growth rate of GDP per capita, but the 
paper suggests that corruption is a significant hindrance for sustainable development (Aidt, 2009). Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 12(1), 2010 
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Also, there are studies that show the impact of corruption on public finance and on the 
public sector functions. 
In this sense, Shleifer and Vishny find that corruption can reduce government revenue and 
lower the level of government output and services, including the provision and financing of health 
care and education services (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). This idea is sustained by Erlich and Lui, 
ho find that corruption can reduce investment in human capital (Erlich and Lui, 1999). Not only the 
quantity of the services  is affected, but also the quality of publicly provided services seems to 
lower, according to Bearse, Glomm and Janeba (Bearse et al., 2000).  
Based on the data for a group of 39 sub-Saharan African countries during 1985-96, Ghura 
(1998)  highlights  that  the  variations  in  tax  revenue-GDP  ratios  rise  with  declining  inflation, 
implementation of structural reforms, rising  human capital (a proxy  for the provision of public 
services by the government) and declining corruption. So, the factors that affect tax revenue-GDP 
ratios are economic policies and the level of corruption. Tanzi and Davoodi also determined the 
impact on public finance and found that corruption not only tends to increase the size of public 
investment, but also skews the composition of public expenditures away from needed operation and 
maintenance  towards  expenditure  on  new  equipment  and  reduces  the  productivity  of  public 
investment  and  cause  the  deterioration  of  a  country’s  infrastructure  and  by  this  reduce  private 
productivity.  On  the  income  side  of  the  budget, corruption  may  reduce  tax  revenue  because  it 
compromises  the  government’s  ability  to  collect  taxes  and  tariffs  (Tanzi  and  Davoodi,  1997). 
Mauro  (1998a,  1998b)  presented  evidence  which  suggests  that  corruption  reduces  public 
expenditures from growth-promoting areas (e.g., health and education) and stimulate other types of 
project (e.g., infrastructure investment) that are less productivity-enhancing, but which offer public 
servants better opportunities to collect bribes. In the same direction, an IRIS Center study for the 
World Bank (Azfar et. al., 2001) demonstrates that corruption can lead to negative effects on health 
care  services  and  health  outcomes(strongly  emphasized  in  the  Philippines  case),  but  also  on 
education outcomes resulting from reduced public sector services in those areas. In a more recent 
work, Azfar and Gurgur find that corruption reduces the outcomes of the public health services, but 
also have a negative effect on education outcomes (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008). In the same article, 
Azfar and Gurgur find that corruption affects public services in rural areas in different ways than 
urban areas, and that corruption harms the poor more than the wealthy. Also, in a series of studies 
coordinated by  DiTella  and Savedoff  it was shown how corruption undermines the efficacy of 
health care in Latin America (DiTella and Savedoff, 2001). 
Based on a simple neoclassical growth model with a self-seeking and corrupt public sector, 
Barreto  and  Alm  finds  that,  holding  the  relative  size  of  government  constant,  the  presence  of 
corruption distorts the country’s tax structure, in a manner that countries affected by corruption 
relies more on consumption taxes than income taxes (Barreto and Alm, 2003). Another finding of 
this study is that the optimal size of government is smaller in an economy with corruption than in 
one without corruption, the explanation being the negative effects of corruption on social welfare 
via the implied loss in production of the public consumption and production goods when corruption 
occurs, effects that are no longer present in a clean economy. Attila integrates corruption in an 
endogenous growth model in two ways: corruption in public spending and corruption in taxation 
and finds that, under certain conditions, corruption can positively affect the rate of growth, but the 
second effect of corruption, and the more devastating one, is that it has a negative impact on growth 
by the tendency to make sub-optimal tax rate that maximizes the rate of growth in the long term and 
by creation of distortions leading to excessive tax rates harmful to growth (Attila, 2008). Cerqueti 
and Coppier demonstrate that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection depends on the 
relevance of the “shame effect”, meaning the possibility of the entrepreneur being detected and 
reported in a corrupt transaction (Cerqueti and Coppier, 2009).  The authors find that in countries 
with a “low shame” effect, tax revenues grow as the tax rate increases. Moreover, there is a critical 
tax rate where the growth rate of tax revenues begins to reduce. In countries with a high “shame Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 12(1), 2010 
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effect” tax revenues increase up to a threshold value and then decrease. As a policy implication, an 
optimal level of taxation exists both for “high shame” and “low shame” countries, which permits 
governments to maximize fiscal revenues, but the action that has to be taken are different.  
Another important category of studies regards the impact of corruption on inequality and 
poverty.  In  this  sense,  Hendriks  et  al.  (1999),  Li  et  al.  (2000),  Gupta  et.  al.  (2002)  argue that 
corruption increases income inequality. Gupta et al. (2002) found further evidence that corruption 
increases inequality in education and land distribution.  
Most of the econometric results reviewed point in the direction show that corruption is bad 
for economic growth, and also bad for a number of economic factors that tend to be correlated with 
growth:  domestic  investment,  the  quantity  and  composition  of  foreign  direct  investment, 
government  expenditure  on  health  and  education,  the  quantity  and  quality  of  government 
investment  in  infrastructure,  and  generally  the  returns  to  business  and  trade.  These  factors  are 
influencing social welfare, so the question is if the presence of corruption tends to reduce social 
welfare. The study intends to verify if there is a correlation between corruption and social welfare, 
viewed from the perspective of Sen’s work on capabilities. 
Base on whole theoretical acquisition, we assume the hypotheses: 
H: The level of social welfare is growing as the intensity of corruption is decreasing. 
In summary, the meanings of the hypothesis’s work relations are: 
 
Table no. 1 
The sense („the sings”) of the hypothesis’s work relation 
The trend of social welfare level  The trend of corruption  
+  - 
-  + 
 
Our fundamental assumption releaves the idea that between social welfare and corruption is 
a strong correlation, by contrary direction. 
 
Methods and results 
To quantify and to analyze the relationship between social welfare (dependent variable) and 
corruption (independent variable), we have considered the period 1996-2008 and a sample of 27 
countries  of  European  Union,  with  different  degrees  of  economic  development  and  political-
administrative  structures.  The  countries  are:  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands,  Denmark,  Ireland,  United  Kingdom,  Greece,  Portugal,  Spain,  Austria,  Finland, 
Sweden, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. 
1. Social welfare (HDI) is quantified by the "Human Development Index" which measures 
the degree of  human development by  combining  life  expectancy, education  levels and realized 
income, on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 denotes a minimum level of welfare and 1 a maximum one. 
2. Intensity of corruption (FC) is quantified by the "Freedom from corruption” which is the 
component of the Index of Economic Freedom, developed by The Heritage Foundation, on a scale 
from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates a very high level of corruption and 100 an extremely small one. 
Based on the illustrated variables, the sense of changes existing between HDI and FC, in 
according with theoretical assumption made above, is as follows: 
 
Table no.2 
The expected sense („the sings”) of the relation between HDI - FC,  
according to working hypothesis 
The trend of HDI  The trend of FC 
+  + 
-  - Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 12(1), 2010 
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The method of analysis used is the econometrical modeling (with software EViews 6.0), 
elaborating a “Pool Date”
3 regressive model, with this shape: 
 
ij t it it v λ βxX α Y                                                        (1) 
 
where  Yit  represents  the  dependent  variable  -  HDI,  α  intercept  term,  β  independent  variables 
coefficients, Xit independent variable - FC,  t λ  time-varying intercept (captures all of the variable 
that  affect  Yit  and  that  vary  over  time  and  cross-sectionally), ij v   the  remainder  disturbance 
(capturing everything that is left unexplained about Yit), i cross-sectional units observed for dated 
periods - (the number of states - 27) and t the period of time (years 1996-2008). 
The econometric analysis has two steps: 
a. The econometric tests of the „pool”; 
b. The “unit root test” of the residuals. 
a. The econometric tests of the „pool data” are presented in Tables no. 3. 
 
Table no.3 
The econometric tests of the „pool data” model HDI – FC in U.E.27’s case 
Dependent Variable: HDI?     
Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR)   
Sample: 1996 2008     
Included observations: 13     
Cross-sections included: 27     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 351   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          BELGIUM--FCBELGIUM  0.013179  0.000285  46.31743  0.0000 
FRANCE--FCFRANCE  0.013083  0.000283  46.28539  0.0000 
GERMANY--FCGERMANY  0.011528  0.000252  45.68250  0.0000 
ITALY--FCITALY  0.017704  0.000389  45.54637  0.0000 
LUXEMBOURG--
FCLUXEMBOURG  0.010569  0.000230  45.91205  0.0000 
NETHERLANDS--
FCNETHERLANDS  0.010863  0.000234  46.45046  0.0000 
DENMARK--FCDENMARK  0.009850  0.000213  46.17317  0.0000 
IRELAND--FCIRELAND  0.012561  0.000274  45.92223  0.0000 
UK--FCUK  0.010742  0.000232  46.22082  0.0000 
GREECE--FCGREECE  0.019823  0.000446  44.48529  0.0000 
PORTUGAL--FCPORTUGAL  0.013784  0.000312  44.22934  0.0000 
SPAIN--FCSPAIN  0.015020  0.000327  45.98501  0.0000 
AUSTRIA--FCAUSTRIA  0.011487  0.000249  46.19148  0.0000 
FINLAND--FCFINLAND  0.009912  0.000214  46.33344  0.0000 
SWEDEN--FCSWEDEN  0.010298  0.000220  46.86137  0.0000 
CYPRUS--FCCYPRUS  0.015765  0.000361  43.73105  0.0000 
ESTONIA--FCESTONIA  0.013505  0.000331  40.85200  0.0000 
LATVIA--FCLATVIA  0.020993  0.000522  40.18858  0.0000 
LITHUANIA--FCLITHUANIA  0.020589  0.000504  40.87203  0.0000 
                                                 
3 For econometric model we used the econometric software Eviews 5.0. Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 12(1), 2010 
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MALTA--FCMALTA  0.018752  0.000438  42.78048  0.0000 
POLAND--FCPOLAND  0.018174  0.000435  41.77663  0.0000 
CZECHR--FCCZECHR  0.018709  0.000436  42.93261  0.0000 
SLOVAKIA--FCSLOVAKIA  0.047514  0.000451  105.3411  0.0000 
SLOVENIA--FCSLOVENIA  0.016336  0.000373  43.80734  0.0000 
HUNGARY--FCHUNGARY  0.016982  0.000406  41.80112  0.0000 
ROMANIA--FCROMANIA  0.024753  0.000639  38.73689  0.0000 
BULGARIA--FCBULGARIA  0.022355  0.000564  39.62554  0.0000 
         
            Weighted Statistics     
         
          R-squared  0.913509     Mean dependent var  9.657922 
Adjusted R-squared  0.906568     S.D. dependent var  9.154091 
S.E. of regression  1.011230     Sum squared resid  331.3182 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.129130       
         
            Unweighted Statistics     
         
          R-squared  0.236670     Mean dependent var  0.937094 
Sum squared resid  32.57704     Durbin-Watson stat  1.121717 
         
 
 
The tests of the model show the following:  
- the absolute values of the standard errors corresponding to the coefficients of the function 
are  lower  than  the  values  of  the  coefficients,  witch  sustains  the  correct  estimation  of  these 
coefficients (a conclusion reinforced by the low values of the probabilities); 
-  the  value  of  the  correlation  coefficient,  shows  a  very  significant  statistical  correlation 
between the dependent variable - HDI and the independent variable - FC (the changes in the FC are 
reflected in proportion by 91.35% in the changes HDI); 
- the Durbin-Watson test (with a resulting  value near to critical  level 2) shows that the 
residual variables are very low autocorrelated. 
More, for a better estimation, we have corrected both period heteroskedasticity and general 
correlation of observations within a given cross-section. Moreover, to obtain the robust coefficient 
standard errors we have applied the Period SUR (PCSE) method. 
b. The “unit root test” of the residuals. For verifying the stationarity of the residuals are 
used the „unit root tests” proposes by Levin, Lin & Chu, Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat, ADF and PP. 
The results are illustrated in Table no. 4. 
 Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 12(1), 2010 
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Table no.4 
The “unit root test” of the residuals 
Sample: 1996 2008     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
         
                Cross-   
Method  Statistic  Prob.**  sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -10.5627   0.0000   27   310 
         
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -7.61896   0.0000   27   310 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   155.218   0.0000   27   310 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   140.915   0.0000   27   324 
         
          ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
All tests indicate that the null  hypothesis  is rejected, meaning that the  „residuals of the 
cross-sectional group” is stationary - I(0).  
In conclusion, the model could be considered representative to describe, at E.U.27’s level, 
the connection between HDI and FC.  
 
Discussion 
The  obtained  results  based  on  the  constructed  model  show  that  corruption  phenomena 
influence in a major extent social welfare. Utilizing the coefficients of independent variable, the 
descending ranking of countries regarding HDI’s elasticity in relation with FC is showed in Table 
no. 5.  
 
Table no. 5 
The ranking of U.E.27’s countries regarding HDI’s elasticity in relation with FC 
No.  Country  Level of coefficient 
1  Slovakia  0.047514 
2  Romania  0.024753 
3  Bulgaria  0.022355 
4  Latvia  0.020993 
5  Lithuania  0.020589 
6  Greece  0.019823 
7  Malta  0.018752 
8  Czechr  0.018709 
9  Poland  0.018174 
10  Italy  0.017704 
11  Hungary  0.016982 
12  Slovenia  0.016336 
13  Cyprus  0.015765 Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 12(1), 2010 
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14  Spain  0.01502 
15  Portugal  0.013784 
16  Estonia  0.013505 
17  Belgium  0.013179 
18  France  0.013083 
19  Ireland  0.012561 
20  Germany  0.011528 
21  Austria  0.011487 
22  Netherlands  0.010863 
23  Uk  0.010742 
24  Luxembourg  0.010569 
25  Sweden  0.010298 
26  Finland  0.009912 
27  Denmark  0.00985 
 
The  results  confirm  the  proposed  theoretical  hypotheses,  following  the  idea  that  the 
limitation of corruption’s phenomena (maximizing FC index) has the result of increasing of social 
welfare (maximizing HDI index).  
 
Conclusions 
As  a  complex  phenomenon,  the  corruption  hits  the  entire  world,  regardless  of  the 
geographical  location,  population,  level  of  economic  development,  political  regime  or  type  of 
government. 
Based on our paper’ results, we find that corruption has a significant negative impact on the 
human well-being (measured by the Human Development Index, which combine the economical 
aspects with some of the most important social ones: health care and education). This is a result of 
the direct consequences of corruption such as: lower growth, affecting resources’ allocations from 
the public budgets, promoting inequality. The main results suggest that the corruption is a “key 
question”  especially  in  developing  and  in  transition  economies,  but  the  disturbance  constant 
unobserved factors decrease the phenomenon and compensate the periodical negative unobserved 
factors.   
In this sense, policies against corruption could be seen as measures for increasing well-being 
of the citizens. 
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